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Abstract
In developing the theory of long-run competitive equilibrium (LRCE), Mar-
shall (1890) used the notion of a representative firm. The identity of this firm,
however, remained unclear, and subsequent theory focused on the case where
all firms are identical. Using Hopenhayn’s (1992) model of competitive industry
dynamics, we extend the theory of LRCE to account for heterogeneous firms
and show that the long-run supply function can indeed be characterized as the
solution to the minimization of a representative average cost function. We also
highlight that famous principles of competitive markets, such as efficiency of the
LRCE allocation, are not robust to heterogeneity.
∗We thank Gian Luca Clementi, Ernesto Dal Bó, Daniel Gottlieb, Luis Rayo, and Andrés
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Figure 1: Textbook model of long-run competitive equilibrium.
1 Introduction
The theory of long-run competitive equilibrium (LRCE), first developed by Marshall
in his Principles of Economics (1890), has had a profound influence on our under-
standing of competitive markets. One distinguishing feature of Marshall’s theory is
his conceptualization of the (long-run) industry supply function. Pigou (1928), Viner
(1953)[1931] and others subsequently formalized Marshall’s notion of LRCE. The lat-
ter author, in particular, is credited for popularizing the typical diagram taught in
introductory courses and reproduced in Figure 1.
The figure represents an industry with fixed input prices where all firms are identi-
cal and characterized by the marginal (MC) and average (AC) cost functions depicted
in the left panel. In an LRCE, price is at the minimum point of the AC function, pe,
and aggregate quantity is given by the demand function evaluated at that price, Qe0.
Suppose that there is a shift of the (inverse) demand function from P d0 to P
d
1 in Figure
1. In the short run, the number of firms stays fixed, so price and quantity increase
from the original LRCE at point A to the new short-run equilibrium at point B, a
movement occurring along the short-run supply function S0. But then firms make
positive (economic) profits, and these profits attract additional firms into the market.
In the long-run, the new LRCE is at point C, where all firms make zero profits at price
pe and aggregate production increases to Qe1. Thus, the (long-run) industry supply
function, SLR, is horizontal at the minimum of the average cost function, p
e.
A distinguishing characteristic of Marshall’s analysis is the notion of a represen-
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tative firm. While Marshall recognized that there are different firms in an industry,
subsequent developments have focused on the case where all firms are identical in a
long-run equilibrium. Viner (1953)[1931], pg. 222, justifies this view:
“If there are particular units of the factors which retain permanently ad-
vantages in value productivity over other units of similar factors, these
units, if hired, will have to be paid for in the long-run at differential rates
proportional to their value productivity, and if employed by their owner
should be charged for costing purposes with the rates which could be ob-
tained for them in the open market and should be capitalized accordingly.”
Viner’s argument may justify why firms do not make rents in the presence of mar-
kets that bid up the price of advantageous factors, such as exceptional managerial
ability. But the argument does not imply that firms with different technologies or
productivities cannot coexist in equilibrium. A realistic feature of an industry is that
low-productivity firms can potentially become high-productivity firms and vice versa.
This feature implies that equilibrium will be characterized both by coexistence of het-
erogeneous firms and turnover (entry and exit), and it does not seem appropriate to
exclude these realistic features from a theory of LRCE.
Our objective in this paper is to go back to Marshall’s original motivation and to
extend the classical theory of LRCE to the case of heterogeneous firms. Fortunately,
we don’t have to formulate a new model, since Hopenhayn (1992) actually introduced
and studied a model of competitive industry dynamics where firms’ productivities
evolve over time and exit and entry is an equilibrium phenomenon. We take the
steady-state equilibrium in Hopenhayn’s model as the natural extension of the theory
of LRCE to the case with heterogeneous firms. Hopenhayn (1992), however, did not
link his work to the early theory on LRCE, and our contribution is to fill-in this gap.
Our main result is that the (long-run) industry supply function with heterogeneous
firms can indeed be characterized as the solution to the minimization of a representa-
tive average cost function, as Marshall originally envisioned. The standard textbook
case, depicted in Figure 1, is just a special case where there is no firm heterogeneity.
There are several reasons to care about this result. First, it formalizes Marshall’s
original motivation of a representative firm and of the industry supply function in the
presence of heterogeneous firms. Second, it provides a connection between the early
literature on LRCE and the modern literature on industry dynamics (to be reviewed
below). Third, it makes the model of LRCE with heterogeneous firms accessible
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to a larger audience (in particular, the example in Section 2.2 conveys much of the
intuition and can be taught in introductory courses). Finally, it helps highlight that
some famous principles of competitive markets are not robust to the inclusion of
firm heterogeneity. We illustrate this last point by showing that aggregate surplus is
generally not maximized in an LRCE with heterogeneous firms.
Our paper links the classic theory of LRCE, which does not explicitly model dy-
namics, with the modern literature on competitive industry dynamics started by Lucas
(1967). Lucas and Prescott (1971) developed the first theory of dynamic competitive
equilibrium with stochastic demand, costly capital stock adjustments, and correct
(i.e., “rational”) expectations about future prices. The theory, however, assumes that
firms are identical and that there is no entry and exit. Subsequent developments in-
corporated both firm heterogeneity and entry and exit, at the expense of no longer
studying the dynamics of capital accumulation. Jovanovic (1982) developed the first
of such models. Each period, a firm draws a productivity shock from a distribution
that depends on an unknown productivity type. Firms have different productivity
types and, as they learn their own type, more productive firms stay and less produc-
tive firms exit. The objective of these papers was to study the dynamic evolution of a
competitive industry, not the steady state. Consequently, all of the interesting action
happens outside the steady state and, indeed, there is no entry and exit in the steady
state of these models.
Hopenhayn (1992) was the first one to consider a model with both heterogeneous
firms and entry and exit in the steady state. In contrast to Jovanovic’s model, firms
know their productivity types, but productivity types evolve randomly in such a way
that firms that have a low productivity today can have a high productivity tomorrow
and vice versa. As mentioned earlier, this is the model that we will use to formalize
Marshall’s idea that the LRCE of a competitive industry is characterized by the cost
function of a representative firm.1
For brevity, we focus on the case where input prices are fixed, which implies that
the long-run industry supply function is horizontal. The extension to the case of
input prices that increase with aggregate quantity was controversial in the early lit-
erature–see Opocher and Steedman (2008) for an insightful historical account. The
1For a model that incorporates capital accumulation to Hopenhayn’s competitive framework,
see Clementi and Palazzo (2016). There is also a large literature, beginning with the work of
Ericson and Pakes (1995), that studies dynamic equilibrium with capital accumulation, stochastic
shocks, heterogeneous firms, and entry and exit under imperfect competition.
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initial approach, by Pigou (1928), Viner (1953)[1931], and others, considered a cost
function that depends both on individual and aggregate quantity. Subsequent lit-
erature (e.g., Kaldor (1934), Allen et al. (1938), and Hicks (1946))) criticized this
reduced-form approach because of lack of microfoundations. For either approach, the
extension of our result is straightforward: A given aggregate quantity leads to a given
equilibrium input price and, fixing this input price, the LRCE price is still the mini-
mum point on a representative average cost function. The long-run industry (inverse)
supply function is simply the mapping from aggregate quantities to these minimum
points. In particular, the aggregate supply function may be increasing if input prices
increase with aggregate quantity.
2 Model and illustrative example
2.1 Setup
We adopt Hopenhayn’s (1992) infinite-horizon model of a competitive industry with
a continuum of potential firms, each of which can produce a homogenous product at
total cost C(q, θ) where q is the quantity produced, θ ∈ Θ = [θL, θH ] ⊂ R is the firm’s
type, and θL < θH .
Each period t = 1, 2, ..., product demand is given by Qd(p), where p ≥ 0 is the
output price. Firms take price as given and choose quantity to maximize profit. There
is also an infinite mass of potential entrants with discount factor δ ∈ [0, 1] who can
decide to enter the market and become a firm. A potential entrant does not know her
type, but knows that her type is independently distributed according to the probability
measure ν ∈ ∆(Θ). A firm entering the market pays a one-time entry cost of κ ≥ 0.
After paying this cost, a firm immediately learns its own type. Thereafter, types evolve
independently across firms according to the probability measure F (· | θ) ∈ ∆(Θ),
where θ is the current type. At the end of the period, each firm makes an exit decision
knowing their current, but not future, type. There is also an exogenous exit probability
ρ. A firm that exits the market (endogenously or exogenously) does so permanently
and obtains a payoff of zero.
We maintain the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. Demand: There exists v > 0 such that Qd(·) is continuous and
decreasing for all p ∈ (0, v), and Qd(p) = 0 for all p ≥ v.
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Assumption 2. Costs: For all θ ∈ Θ: C(·, θ) is continuously differentiable, with
C(q, θ) ≥ 0, C ′(q, θ) ≥ 0, and C ′′(q, θ) > 0 for all q ≥ 0, and limq→∞C
′(q, θ) = ∞;
For all q ≥ 0, C(q, ·) is increasing.
Assumption 3. Order over types: For any θ1 < θ2, F (θ | θ2) < F (θ | θ1) for all
θ ∈ (θL, θH).
Assumption 4. The exogenous probability of exit is positive, i.e., ρ > 0.
Assumption 5. Measures over types: (i) ν has a continuous probability density func-
tion (pdf), fν(·), with support equal to Θ; (ii) For all θ: F (· | θ) has a pdf f(· | θ),
with support equal to Θ, and (θ′, θ) 7→ f(θ′ | θ) is jointly continuous.
Assumption 1 implies the existence of a downward sloping inverse demand function,
P d(·). Assumption 2 implies existence and uniqueness of an optimal quantity
q(p, θ) ≡ argmax
q≥0
pq − C(q, θ)
The assumption also implies that the profit function
π(p, θ) ≡ pq(p, θ)− C(q(p, θ), θ).
is nonincreasing in θ, and decreasing for (p, θ) such that q(p, θ) > 0. Note also that
each firm has a fixed cost C(0, θ) which is sunk once the firm decides to enter or stay
in the industry.
Assumption 3 postulates a first-order stochastic dominance relationship across
types, so that higher types today are more likely to become higher types tomorrow.
Assumption 4 guarantees that the life span of a firm is almost surely finite; in partic-
ular, if there is no entry, then there must be zero aggregate production in equilibrium.
This assumption is made for simplicity, puts the focus on equilibria with positive
entry, and allows us to include the special case where firms’ types are permanent.2
Assumption 5 lists technical conditions regarding the measures over types.
2Hopenhayn (1992) instead assumes that ρ = 0 and guarantees finite lifespan with an additional
recurrence condition on F . He then restricts attention to equilibria with positive entry.
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Assumption 6. π(v, θH) > κ.
Assumption 6 is made for simplicity. It rules out equilibria with zero aggregate
production by requiring that even the highest-cost firm prefers to enter whenever price
equals the maximum willingness to pay, v.
The expected net present discounted value of a firm of type θ who faces (steady-
state) price p every period is
V (p, θ) = π(p, θ) + δ(1− ρ)max
{ˆ
Θ
V (p, θ′)F (dθ′ | θ), 0
}
. (1)
Assumption 3 and the fact that π(p, ·) is decreasing imply that
´
Θ
V (p, θ′)F (dθ′ | .)
is decreasing. Therefore, the optimal exit decision in steady state is characterized by
a marginal type m ∈ Θ with the property that all lower types stay and all higher
types exit the market.
Let µ(n,m) denote the steady-state measure of types of firms given the mass of
entrants n ≥ 0 and the marginal type m ∈ Θ. In particular, for any Borel set A ⊆ Θ,
µ(n,m)(A) = ν(A)n + (1− ρ)
ˆ m
θL
F (A | θ)µ(n,m)(dθ). (2)
The assumption that ρ > 0 guarantees existence of a steady-state measure.
The corresponding aggregate supply at price p is
Qs(p;n,m) ≡
ˆ
Θ
q(p, θ)µ(n,m)(dθ).
Definition 1. A tuple 〈pe, ne, me〉 is a long-run competitive equilibrium (LRCE)
if the following conditions are satisfied:
(i) Market clearing: Qd(pe) = Qs(pe;ne, me).
(ii) Unlimited entry:
´
Θ
V (pe, θ)ν(dθ) ≤ κ, with equality if ne > 0.
(iii) Optimal exit:
´
Θ
V (pe, θ′)F (dθ′ | me) = 0 if me ∈ (θL, θH), ≥ 0 if m
e = θH ,
and ≤ 0 if me = θL.
An LRCE captures the steady state of the dynamic competitive industry.3 The
first condition requires market clearing and already incorporates the assumption of
3Hopenhayn (1992) called an LRCE a stationary equilibrium and showed that it corresponds to
the steady state of a perfect foresight equilibrium of the dynamic environment.
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profit maximization. The second condition requires the net present value of entry to
equal the entry cost if the mass of entrants is positive. It is known as the “free entry”
condition, but we reserve that terminology for the case in which entry is actually free,
i.e., κ = 0. The third condition requires the marginal type to be indifferent between
staying or exiting the market, provided it is an interior type.
Lemma 1. In any LRCE, both aggregate production and entry must be positive.
Proof. Suppose pe is an LRCE price and Qd(pe) = 0. By Assumption 1, pe ≥ v. By
the fact that π(p, θ) is nondecreasing in p and nonincreasing in θ and by Assumption
6, π(pe, θ) ≥ π(v, θ) ≥ π(v, θH) > κ for all θ. Thus, V (p
e, θ) > κ for all θ, so
that pe does not satisfy the entry condition (ii) in Definition 1, contradicting the fact
that pe is an LRCE price. Therefore, Qd(pe) > 0 and by condition (i) in Definition 1,
Qs(pe;ne, me) > 0, which then implies, by the assumption that ρ > 0, that ne > 0.
Definition 2. The long-run industry (inverse) supply function is a function
Q 7→ P sLR(Q) with the property that, for any Q > 0, p = P
s
LR(Q) is the unique price
satisfying the following conditions for some w > 0, m ∈ Θ, and n > 0:
(i) Q = Qs(p;n,m).
(ii)
´
Θ
V (p, θ)ν(dθ) = κ.
(iii)
´
Θ
V (p, θ′)F (dθ′ | m) = 0 if m ∈ (θL, θH), ≥ 0 if m = θH , and ≤ 0 if m = θL.
The next result follows immediately from the definitions and from Lemma 1’s
implication that the entry condition in Definition 2 holds with equality in equilibrium.
Proposition 1. Suppose that the long-run industry supply function P sLR(·) exists.
Then pe is part of an LRCE if and only if pe = P sLR(Q
d(pe)) and Qd(pe) > 0.
Proposition 1 simply says that the LRCE price is such that supply equals demand.
When firms are identical, it is well known that the long-run industry supply function
is horizontal at the minimum point of the average cost function. Our objective is to
characterize this function for the environment described in this section, where firms
are heterogeneous.
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2.2 A simple example
We discuss an example with three objectives in mind: It is simple enough to be taught
in introductory courses, it conveys much (but not all) of the intuition behind our
results, and it is sufficient to see that standard properties of LRCE with homogeneous
firms do not extend to heterogeneous firms.
We assume that: (i) there are only two types, not a continuum, θH > θL ≥ 0,
and each type is equally likely to be drawn by an entrant; (ii) C(q, θ) = c(q) + θ, so
that a firm’s type represents its fixed cost and all firms have the same marginal cost
MC(q) ≡ c′(q); (iii) the entry cost is zero, κ = 0; (iv) types are permanent, so that
a firm keeps the type it draws upon entry for its entire lifetime; and (v) firms are
impatient, δ < 1. The variable cost function c(·) satisfies the following conditions:
c(0) = 0, c′(0) = 0, c′(q) > 0 and c′′(q) > 0 for all q > 0, and limq→∞ c
′(q) =∞.
steady-state measure of types. It is easy to see that type θL will stay and
type θH will exit in equilibrium; in particular, we will drop m from the notation.
4 The
steady-state mass of firms of type θL, denoted by µL, is determined by the steady-state
mass of entrants, n, as follows:
µL = n/2 + µL(1− ρ). (3)
The RHS of equation (3) is the sum of the mass of entrants of type θL, n/2, and
the mass of firms of type θL that were already present and did not exit exogenously,
µL(1 − ρ). The equation implies that, in steady state, the mass of type θL remains
constant. For firms of type θH , who never stay for more than one period, their mass
is half the mass of entrants. Thus, the steady-state masses of firms of each type as a
function of the mass of entrants, n, are
µL(n) = n/(2ρ) and µH(n) = n/2.
long-run industry supply function. The conditions in the definition of the
long-run supply function become:
(i) Q = (µL(n) + µH(n))q(p) > 0.
(ii) (Free entry) NPV (p) ≡ 1
2
π(p, θL)/(1− δ(1− ρ)) +
1
2
π(p, θH) = 0.
4For the free entry condition to hold for p > 0, the profit of type θH must be negative. Because
types are permanent, type θH will find it optimal to exit.
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Condition (i) requires aggregate output supply to equal Q. Condition (ii) requires
that the net present value of an entrant is zero. With probability 1/2, a firm is of
type θL and remains in the market until it has to exogenously exit, thus expecting a
net present value of π(p, θL)/(1 − δ(1 − ρ)). With probability 1/2, a firm is of type
θH , makes profit π(p, θH), and exits the market.
The weights on the profit functions of each type in the free-entry condition have an
intuitive interpretation. The weight ΛL ≡ 1/(2(1−δ(1−ρ)) on π(p, θL) is equal to the
steady-state mass of type θL, normalized by the mass of entrants n, in a hypothetical
world where firms, instead of exiting with probability ρ, exit with probability 1 −
δ(1 − ρ).5 The hypothetical and actual probabilities of exit coincide as δ → 1, and
so the weight asymptotically equals the actual, normalized steady-state mass of type
θL. Similarly, the weight ΛH ≡ 1/2 on π(p, θL) is equal to the normalized steady-state
mass of firms of type θH (here, δ is irrelevant because type θH exits with probability
1). Thus, the net present value of entry can be written as
NPV (p) = ΛLπ(p, θL) + ΛHπ(p, θH)
= pq(p)(ΛL + ΛH)− (ΛLC(q(p), θL) + ΛHC(q(p), θH)). (4)
By equation (4), the solution pe to NPV (pe) = 0 satisfies
pe = ACe(q(pe),Λ) ≡
ΛLAC(q(p
e), θL) + ΛHAC(q(p
e), θH)
(ΛL + ΛH)
, (5)
where Λ ≡ (ΛL,ΛH), AC(q, θ) ≡ C(q, θ)/q is the average cost of type θ, and q 7→
ACe(q,Λ) is a weighted average cost function.
By profit maximization, pe = MC(q(pe)), and so (5) implies that pe equalizes
marginal and weighted average cost,
pe = MC(q(pe)) = ACe(q(pe),Λ). (6)
The left panel of Figure 2 illustrates how to find pe. The figure plots the marginal
cost function common to all types, MC(·), the average cost function for each type,
AC(·, θ), and the weighted average cost function ACe(·,Λ). The zero-profit price pe is
given by the intersection of the marginal cost and weighted average cost functions, and
5Formally, ΛL ≡ µE(n, δ)(θL)/n, where µE(n, δ)(θL) solves µE(n, δ)(θL) = n/2 +
µE(n, δ)(θL)δ(1 − ρ).
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qpie > 0
MC
AC(·, θL)
AC∗
ACe(·,Λ)
AC(·, θH)
pe
q∗min q
e
min
P d(.)
Qe Q∗ Q
Figure 2: Long-run competitive equilibrium in the example.
this intersection occurs at the minimum point on the weighted average cost function.6
Therefore, q(pe) = qemin ≡ argminq AC
e(q,Λ) and the zero-profit price pe is
pe = ACe(qemin,Λ) = min
q
ACe(q,Λ).
Finally, it is straightforward to check that, since pe > 0, there exists n(Q) > 0 sat-
isfying condition (i) in Definition 2, i.e., Q = (µL(n(Q))+µH(n(Q)))q(p
e). Therefore,
the long-run supply function exists and is horizontal at the price that minimizes the
weighted average cost function ACe(·). Thus, provided that P d(0) > pe, there exists
a unique LRCE where price is pe and the mass of entrants ne is such that the product
market clears, i.e., Qd(pe) = (µL(n
e) + µH(n
e))qemin.
7
Figure 2 also illustrates that aggregate profits are strictly positive in an LRCE.
The equilibrium profit of the average firm is πe ≡ (pe − AC∗(qemin))q
e
min > 0, where
qemin is the quantity produced by each firm and
AC∗(·) ≡
(1/(2ρ))AC(·, θL) + (1/2)AC(·, θH)
((1/(2ρ)) + 1/2)
is the per-unit cost function of the average firm producing in equilibrium. The weights
in AC∗(·) correspond to the steady-state proportion of firms of each type. While these
6For a proof that the intersection occurs at the minimum point of ACe(·,Λ), note that the first
order condition for the problem minq AC
e(q,Λ) is precisely the condition MC(q) = ACe(q,Λ).
Moreover, the second order condition is satisfied because c′′(q) > 0 for all q > 0.
7The solution is unique and given by ne = Qd(pe)/((1/2ρ+ 1/2)qemin).
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weights converge to Λ as δ → 1, for the case δ < 1, AC∗(·) puts more weight on the
low cost type relative to ACe(·,Λ). Intuitively, the selection in exit implies that the
steady-state composition of firms is tilted towards low-cost firms relative to the ex-
ante perception of a potential entrant who discounts the future. Thus, while potential
entrants make zero profits ex-ante, the actual firms operating in the steady state make
strictly positive profits.
The result that profits are strictly positive in an LRCE changes many of the
implications of the textbook model of LRCE, such as the idea that 100% of the
incidence from tax policy must fall on the demand side, or the idea that benefits from
a subsidies must accrue exclusively to the owner of a fixed input factor, or the idea
that aggregate surplus is maximized in equilibrium. In this example, a planner who
wishes to maximize steady-state surplus prefers a higher aggregate quantity Q∗, a
lower quantity per firm q∗min, and a higher mass of entrants n
∗ compared to the LRCE
quantities Qe, qemin, and n
e. Of course, the planner’s preferred outcome is not an
equilibrium outcome, because the net present value of entry would be negative and
firms would not enter to begin with.
In the special case where there is a single type, θL = θH , the standard textbook
results hold: The industry supply function is horizontal at the price that equals the
minimum of the average cost function (all firms have the same cost function), each
firm makes zero profits, and aggregate surplus is maximized in an LRCE (irrespective
of the value of the discount factor δ). Alternatively, we can interpret the standard
textbook model as a case where firms are of different types but know their types before
entering the market. In that case, only firms of type θL will operate in the market in
an LRCE.
beyond the simple example. We extend the logic in the example in several
directions. First, marginal costs may differ by type. We will tackle this case by
expressing the average cost function in terms of price, not quantity. Second, types
may be non-permanent. When types follow a more general Markov process, optimal
entry decisions are the solution to a non-trivial dynamic optimization problem. We
will use results from the theory of bounded linear operators to show that, nevertheless,
ex-ante expected profits can still be expressed as the weighted average of the profits of
each type. Third, there may be a continuum of types. In this case, exit decisions will
no longer be trivially characterized and we will see, for example, that exit decisions
are also inefficient from the perspective of a planner who wants to maximize aggregate
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equilibrium surplus. Fourth, strictly positive entry costs need to be incorporated into
the definition of average cost.
3 Characterization of long-run industry supply
To state the main result, we first define an average weighted cost function. Letting
M(Θ) be the space of finite Borel measures that are absolutely continuous with respect
to Lebesgue, we define C¯ : [0,∞)×M(Θ)→ [0,∞) as
C¯(p, η) =
ˆ
Θ
C(q(p, θ), θ)η(dθ) + κ
for all p ≥ 0 and η ∈ M(Θ). This is the weighted cost with respect to a measure η.
Similarly, let q¯ : [0,∞)×M(Θ)→ [0,∞) be defined by
q¯(p, η) =
ˆ
Θ
q(p, θ)η(dθ).
The corresponding average weighted cost function is then defined by
A¯C(p, η) ≡ C¯(p, η)/q¯(p, η),
provided that q¯(p, η) > 0.8 In the case where marginal costs are identical, the average
weighted cost coincides with the weighted average cost, as in the example, but this is
not true in general.
Next, for each n, m, and δ, we define µE(n,m, δ) ∈ M(Θ) to be the steady-state
measure of types of firms when the mass of entrants is n, firms survive with exogenous
probability δ(1− ρ), and surviving firms exit endogenously if their type is lower than
m ∈ Θ, i.e., for any Borel set A ⊆ Θ,
µE(n,m, δ)(A) = ν(A)n + δ(1− ρ)
ˆ m
θL
F (A | θ)µE(n,m, δ)(dθ).
For the special case of δ = 1, µE(n,m, 1) = µ(n,m) is the actual steady-state measure
of types defined in equation (2), because in the model firms survive with exogenous
probability 1− ρ, not δ(1− ρ).
8If q¯(p, η) = 0, we define A¯C(p, η) =∞.
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Finally, since µE is linear in n, we define the normalized mass
Λ(m, δ) ≡ µE(n,m, δ)/n ∈M(Θ).
We now state the main result.
Theorem 1. The long-run industry supply function exists and it is given, for any
Q > 0, by
P SLR(Q) = min
p,m
A¯C(p,Λ(m, δ)).
Theorem 1 extends the textbook characterization of the long-run supply function
to a setting with heterogeneous firms. The long-run supply function is horizontal at
a price that minimizes the average weighted cost function, where the minimum is
with respect to both price and the marginal type. The average weight cost function
is constructed using the measure Λ(m, δ), which can be viewed as the normalized
steady-state cross-sectional distribution of firm types in a hypothetical world where
firms survive with exogenous probability δ(1−ρ) and surviving firms exit endogenously
if their type is lower than m.
In particular, Theorem 1 formalizes Marshall’s notion of a representative firm as
a hypothetical firm with average cost function A¯C. In the special case where all firms
have identical marginal cost functions (as in the example), the average cost function
of the representative firm, A¯C, corresponds to a weighted average of the average cost
functions.
Corollary 1. There exists a unique LRCE and it is characterized by positive entry
and positive aggregate production.
Proof. Follows immediately from Proposition 1, Theorem 1, and the fact that assump-
tion 6 and monotonicity of π(·, θ) imply that minp,m A¯C(p,Λ(m, δ)) < v.
3.1 Proof of Theorem 1
We will show that there is a unique solution (pe, me) to conditions
(ii)
´
Θ
V (p, θ)ν(dθ) = κ, and
(iii)
´
Θ
V (p, θ′)F (dθ′ | m) = 0 if m ∈ (θL, θH), ≥ 0 if m = θH , and ≤ 0 if m = θL
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in Definition 2, and that this solution satisfies
(pe, me) = min
p,m
A¯C(p,Λ(m, δ)).
The proof has three steps. Throughout the proof, we let ̺ ≡ δ(1− ρ).
step 1. For any (p, θ) ∈ R+ ×Θ and m ∈ Θ, let
Vm(p, θ) = π(p, θ) + ̺Tm[Vm(p, ·)](θ) (7)
where Tm[g](θ) = 1{θ ≤ m}
´
Θ
g(θ′)F (dθ′ | θ). In words, Vm differs from the value
function V defined in equation (1) in that it forces a possibly suboptimal exit decision
threshold m.
Consider the system of equations:
(ii’)
´
Θ
Vm(p, θ)ν(dθ) = κ, and
(iii’)
´
Θ
Vm(p, θ
′)F (dθ′ | m) = 0 if m ∈ (θL, θH), ≥ 0 if m = θH , and ≤ 0 if m = θL.
We will show that we can work with the system of equations (ii’)-(iii’) rather than
(ii)-(iii).
Lemma 2. If (p,m) is the unique solution to (ii’)-(iii’), then (p,m) must also be the
unique solution to (ii)-(iii).
Proof. Let (p,m) be the unique solution to (ii’)-(iii’). In particular, m is the unique
solution to (iii’) given p. Let m0 be the optimal exit threshold given p. In particular,´
Θ
Vm0(p, θ
′)F (dθ′ | m) = 0 if m ∈ (θL, θH), ≥ 0 if m = θH , and ≤ 0 if m = θL.
Since m is the unique solution to (iii’) given p, it follows that m = m0 and, therefore,
Vm = Vm0 . In addition, by optimality of m0 and the one-shot deviation principle,
Vm0 = V . Therefore, (p,m) solves (ii)-(iii). To show uniqueness, suppose that (p
′, m′)
solves (ii)-(iii). Then V = Vm′ and so (p
′, m′) must also solve (ii’)-(iii’). But since
(p,m) is the unique solution to (ii’)-(iii’), it must be that (p′, m′) = (p,m).
step 2. In this step, we will show that conditions (ii’)-(iii’) can be equivalently
expressed using weighted profit functions. This is one of the main insights of the
proof and it relies on the concept of the adjoint of a bounded operator to identify the
appropriate weight over profit functions.
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For each m ∈ Θ, define an operator Φm :M(Θ)→M(Θ) such that, for all A ⊆ Θ
Borel,
Φm[η](A) =
ˆ m
θL
F (A | θ˜)η(dθ˜).
Φm[η] gives the measure of types that results from applying the Markov operator F
to current types that are below the marginal type m, when the measure of current
types is η.
The next result collects two useful properties of the operator Φm.
Lemma 3. (i) For any ̺ ∈ [0, 1) and m ∈ Θ,
∑∞
j=0 ̺
jΦjm = (I − ̺Φm)
−1 is a bounded
operator from M(Θ) to itself, where I is the identity operator; (ii) For all j, Φjm is
the adjoint operator of T jm.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Using the operator Φm, µE can be alternatively written as
µE(n,m, δ) = νn + ̺Φm[µE(n,m, δ)].
Analogously, we can define µX(n,m, δ) ∈M(Θ) as the same measure, except that the
distribution of entrants is the one facing the marginal exit type, F (· | m), i.e.,
µX(n,m, δ) = F (· | m)n + ̺Φm[µX(n,m, δ)].
By Lemma 3(i),
Λ(m, δ) = µE(n,m, δ)/n = (I − ̺Φm)
−1[ν] (8)
and
ΛX(m, δ) ≡ µX(n,m, δ)/n ≡ (I − ̺Φm)
−1[F (· | m)].
Our goal is to show that we can express the value functions in terms of weighted
profit functions, with weights Λ and ΛX for the entry and exit conditions, respectively.
For this purpose, we define the weighted profit function π¯ : [0,∞)×M(Θ)→ R, where
π¯(p, η) =
ˆ
π(p, θ)η(dθ)
15
for all p ≥ 0 and η ∈ M(Θ). We then state the following two conditions, which the
next lemma will show to be equivalent to conditions (ii’)-(iii’).
Condition (ii”). π¯(p,Λ(m, δ)) = κ.
Condition (iii”). π¯(p,ΛX(m, δ)) = 0 if m ∈ (θL, θH), ≥ 0 if m = θH , and ≤ 0 if
m = θL.
Lemma 4. (p,m) solves (ii’)-(iii’) if and only if it solves (ii”)-(iii”).
Proof. By repeatedly applying equation (7), it follows that
Vm(p, θ) =
∞∑
j=0
̺jT jm[π(p, θ)](θ).
Then
ˆ
Vm(p, θ)ν(dθ) =
ˆ ∞∑
j=0
̺jT jm[π(p, ·)](θ)
=
ˆ
π(p, θ)
(
∞∑
j=0
̺jΦjm[v](dθ)
)
=
ˆ
π(p, θ) (I − ̺Φm)
−1 [ν](dθ)
=
ˆ
π(p, θ)Λ(m, δ)(dθ) = π¯(p,Λ(m, δ)),
where the second line follows because Φjm is the adjoint operator of T
j
m (see Lemma
3(ii)) and the last line follows by definition of Λ in equation (8). A similar argument
establishes
´
Θ
Vm(p, θ
′)F (dθ′ | m) = π¯(p,ΛX(m, δ)).
step 3. We conclude the proof by showing that the solution to (ii”)-(iii”) is unique
and minimizes the average weighted cost function.
Lemma 5. There is a unique (pe, me) satisfying conditions (ii”)-(iii”), and it is char-
acterized by
{(pe, me)} = argmin
p′,m′
A¯C(p′,Λ(m′, δ)).
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mp
me
pe
m˜
p˜
p¯i(p,ΛX(m, δ)) = 0
p¯i(p,Λ(m, δ)) = κ
⇐⇒
p = A¯C(p,Λ(m, δ))
⇐⇒
p = minp′ A¯C(p
′,Λ(m, δ))
Figure 3: Characterization of entry and exit conditions.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Figure 3 describes the intuition behind Lemma 5. The pair (pe, me) that solves (ii”)-
(iii”) is given by the intersection of the zero entry-profit schedule π¯(p, w,Λ(m, δ)) = κ
and the zero exit-profit schedule π¯(p, w,ΛX(m, δ)) = 0 in the (p,m) space. By a
simple generalization of the textbook model, the former equation is equivalent to the
condition that p = A¯C(p, w,Λ(m, δ)) = minp′ A¯C(p
′
, w,Λ(m, δ)); denote the solution
to this equation by pˆ(m). As illustrated by the figure, it is also the case that the zero
exit-profit schedule intersects the zero entry-profit schedule at the minimum point of
the latter. Thus, me minimizes A¯C(pˆ(m),Λ(m, δ)). In other words, (pe, me) jointly
minimize A¯C, as stated in Lemma 5.
The reason why the two schedules in Figure 3 intersect at the minimum point of the
zero entry-profit schedule is as follows. Consider a point (p˜, m˜) on the zero entry-profit
schedule such that m˜ < me. This point lies above the zero exit-profit schedule; that
is, π¯(p˜,ΛX(m˜, δ)) > 0, and so the marginal type m˜ makes a strictly positive profit. If
the marginal type were slightly increased from m˜ to m˜ + ε, then a potential entrant
would get to stay whenever drawing a type in (m˜, m˜ + ε). By continuity, its profit
from having a type in the interval would be positive, and so the firm’s ex-ante profit
would increase from zero to a strictly positive number. The price would then need to
fall in order to remain on the zero entry-profit schedule. Thus, the zero entry-profit
schedule is decreasing whenever it is above the zero exit-profit schedule. By a similar
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argument, the zero entry-profit is increasing whenever it is below the zero exit-profit
schedule.
3.2 Equilibrium surplus
We conclude by comparing the equilibrium allocation with the allocation that maxi-
mizes steady-state aggregate surplus. We focus on the interesting case where me 6= θL,
so that not all firms exit in equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Consider an LRCE such that me 6= θL. Then the equilibrium alloca-
tion maximizes steady-state surplus if and only if δ = 1. Moreover, if δ < 1, aggregate
quantity is strictly lower and each firm’s individual quantity is weakly higher in the
LRCE, compared to the surplus-maximizing, allocation.
Proof. A planner who wishes to maximize steady-state surplus must equalize marginal
costs across all firms. Letting p be this common marginal cost, the planner’s problem
becomes
max
(Q,p,m,n)
ˆ Q
0
P d(Q˜)dQ˜−
ˆ
Θ
C(q(p, θ), θ)µ(m,n)(dθ)− κn
subject to Q = q¯(p,Λ(m, 1))n. Substituting the constraint and using the definition of
A¯C, the problem becomes
max
(Q,p,m)
ˆ Q
0
P d(Q˜)dQ˜−QA¯C(p,Λ(m, 1)).
It is immediate that the planner’s solution is (p∗, m∗) = minp,m A¯C(p,Λ(m, 1)) and
P d(Q) = A¯C(p∗,Λ(m∗, 1)). By Theorem 1, the planner’s solution coincides with the
LRCE allocation for δ = 1.
For the second part, let 〈pe1, n
e
1, m
e
1〉 and 〈p
e
2, n
e
2, m
e
2〉 be LRCE for δ1 and δ2, re-
spectively, where δ1 < δ2 and m
e
1 > θL. Let V1 and V2 be the corresponding value
functions. Then
ˆ
V2(p
e
1, θ)ν(dθ) >
ˆ
V1(p
e
1, θ)ν(dθ) = κ =
ˆ
V2(p
e
2, θ)ν(dθ),
where the strict inequality follows from the fact that future payoffs are strictly positive
(since me1 > θL and ν has full support) and the equality follows from the zero-profit
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equilibrium condition. Since V2(·, θ) is nondecreasing, it follows that p
e
2 < p
e
1. The
second part of the claim then follows by setting δ2 = 1 and applying the first part.
Intuitively, the firms’ entry problem is a problem of experimentation. Firms don’t
know their types ex-ante and, once they enter, they have the potential to become more
productive over time. A long-lived planner who is more patient than the firms puts
a higher value on entry because lower productivity firms exit and, in the long-run,
only the more productive firms will remain in the industry. As Proposition 2 shows,
the case of a planner who cares about long-run surplus is an extreme case where the
planner is essentially infinitely patient. The divergence in discount factors implies
that, under such planner, the steady state will be characterized by more productive
firms, higher aggregate production, and higher consumer surplus, resulting in a higher
overall aggregate steady-state surplus. This is not true, however, in the standard
textbook model where firms are homogeneous and there is free entry.9
We are not necessarily advocating for a planner who cares only about the steady
state, although we note that, as Proposition 2 highlights, this is the implicit assump-
tion whenever researchers focus on long-run equilibrium outcomes, which is a common
approach.10 More generally, it does make sense for a long-lived planner, such as an
antitrust authority, to have a higher discount factor than the firms. In that case,
Proposition 2 continues to hold, as illustrated by Figure 4. As the discount factor
increases from δ to δ′ > δ, both the zero entry-profit and the zero exit-profit schedules
characterized in the proof of Theorem 1 move to the right. The former does so strictly
and the latter does so weakly in the special case of permanent types, and strictly in all
other cases. Consequently, a planner who is more patient than the firms always wants
the price to be lower than the LRCE price, meaning that he wants higher aggregate
production. The effect on exit is, however, ambiguous, as it depends on how much
each of the schedules shifts relative to the other one. It is always the case, however,
9Notably, the LRCE allocation also fails to maximize surplus whenever entry costs are positive,
even with homogeneous firms. The reason is that discounting once again becomes relevant with
positive entry costs, since less patient firms discount future profits more relative to the initial entry
cost.
10An alternative is to take a explicit stand on the dynamics leading to equilibrium. For example,
Hopenhayn (1992) studies a perfect foresight equilibrium of the dynamic environment, where an
equilibrium entry condition holds every period. He shows that a perfect foresight equilibrium is
efficient and that, if it converges, it converges to an LRCE. Thus, under the assumption of perfect
foresight and convergence of equilibrium, one could interpret an LRCE as being efficient from the
point of view of a planner who discounts the future at the same rate as the firms.
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mp
me
pe
m∗
p∗
p¯i(p,ΛX(m, δ)) = 0
p¯i(p,ΛX(m, δ
′)) = 0
p¯i(p,Λ(m, δ)) = κ
p¯i(p,Λ(m, δ′)) = κ
Figure 4: Comparison of equilibrium vs. planner’s allocation (δ < δ′).
that the planner wants to encourage firms to stay more than desired at the planner’s
optimal price p∗.
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A Appendix
A.1 Proof of Lemma 3
Let L(M(Θ)) denote the space of linear bounded operators mapping M(Θ) to itself.
(i) Since ̺||Φm|| < 1 (here ||.|| is the operator norm
11), it is easy to see that the
sequence (
∑n
j=0 ̺
jΦjm)n is Cauchy (under the operator norm). Because L(M(Θ)) is
complete, then S ≡
∑∞
j=0 ̺
jΦjm ∈ L(M(Θ)). It is easy to see that ̺ΦmS = S − I or,
equivalently, (I − ̺Φm)S = I; similarly S(I − ̺Φm) = I. Therefore, S is the inverse
of (I − ̺Φm), denoted by (I − ̺Φm)
−1. (ii) Let g ∈ L∞(Θ) and let η be any Borel
measure of Θ. By Fubini’s Theorem,
ˆ
Θ
Tm[g](θ)η(dθ) =
ˆ
Θ
g(θ′)
{ˆ
1{θ ≤ m}F (dθ′ | θ)η(dθ)
}
=
ˆ
Θ
g(θ′)Φm[η](dθ
′).
(9)
Expression (9) can be equivalently be cast as 〈Tm [g] , η〉 = 〈g,Φm [η]〉, where 〈., .〉
denotes the integral operation. Using this notation, it is easy to see that, for any j,
〈T jm [g] , η〉 = 〈Tm
[
T j−1m [g]
]
, η〉 = 〈
[
T j−1m [g]
]
,Φm [η]〉 = ... = 〈g,Φ
j
m [η]〉. 
A.2 Proof of Lemma 5
Throughout this proof, we use the following properties for Vm. The proof of these
properties follow from standard fixed point arguments and are thus omitted: (1) For
any m ∈ Θ, p 7→ M [Vm(p, .)](m) is nondecreasing and increasing over p such that
q(p,m) > 0; (2) For any m ∈ Θ, θ 7→M [Vm(p, .)](θ) is decreasing; (3) For any m ∈ Θ,
p 7→M [Vm(p, ·)](m) is continuous.
Before proving Lemma 5, we state and prove two preliminary results.
Lemma 6. For any p > 0 and any m ∈ Θ such that π¯(p,ΛX(m)) = 0, M [Vm′(p, .)−
Vm(p, .)](θ) < 0 for all m
′ 6= m and θ ∈ Θ.
11The space M(Θ) is equipped with the total variation norm and the operator norm ||Φm|| ≡
supη 6=0
||Φm[η]||TV
||η||TV
≤ 1 where ||η||TV ≡ 0.5
´
Θ
|fη(θ)|dθ where fη is the Radon-Nikodym derivative of
η with respect to Lebesgue.
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Proof. Fix any θ ∈ Θ. We first show the result for m′ < m. By definition of Vm(p, .),
M [Vm′(p, .)− Vm(p, .)](θ) =̺
ˆ
{1{θ′ ≤ m′}M [Vm′(p, .)]− 1{θ
′ ≤ m}M [Vm(p, .)](θ
′)}F (dθ′ | θ)
=̺
ˆ
1{m ≤ θ′ ≤ m′}M [Vm(p, .)](θ
′)F (dθ′ | θ)
+ ̺
ˆ
1{θ′ ≤ m′}M [Vm′(p, .)− Vm(p, .)](θ
′)F (dθ′ | θ)
≡Am′,m(θ) + ̺Km′ [M [Vm′(p, .)− Vm(p, .)]] (θ),
where Km′ : L
∞(Θ)→ L∞(Θ).
Observe that M [Vm(p, .)](m) = π¯(p,ΛX(m)) = 0 and also θ 7→ M [Vm(p, .)](θ) is
decreasing, hence 1{m ≤ θ ≤ m′}M [Vm(p, .)](θ) < 0, which implies Am′,m(.) < 0 (note
that F (· | θ) has full support for all θ ∈ Θ by Assumption 5(ii)). Since ̺||Km′ || =
̺ supg∈L∞(Θ)
||K
m′
[g]||L∞(Θ)
||g||L∞(Θ)
≤ ̺ < 1, by the analogous arguments in the proof of Lemma
3,
M [Vm′(p, .)− Vm(p, .)](θ) = (I − ̺Km′)
−1 [Am′,m] (θ) =
∞∑
j=0
̺jKjm′ [Am′,m] (θ).
We note that for any g(.) < 0, Km′ [g] (.) =
´
1{θ′ ≤ m′}g(θ′)F (dθ′ | .) < 0.
Hence, from this fact and the fact that Am′,m(.) < 0, we can show inductively that for
each j, ̺jKjm′ [Am′,m] (.) and thus M [Vm′(p, .)− Vm(p, .)](θ) < 0.
We now show the case for m′ > m. Following the same steps as those above one
obtains
M [Vm′(p, .)− Vm(p, .)](θ) =−Am,m′(θ) + ̺Km′ [M [Vm′(p, .)− Vm(p, .)]] (θ).
Since Am,m′(θ) = 1{m
′ ≤ θ ≤ m}M [Vm(p, .)](θ), it follows that Am,m′(θ) > 0. This
observation and analogous derivations to the ones form′ < m imply thatM [Vm′(p, .)−
Vm(p, .)](θ) < 0.
Lemma 7. (p,m) 7→ π¯(p,Λ(m)) and (p,m) 7→ π¯(p,ΛX(m)) are continuous.
Proof. We only prove continuity of (p,m) 7→ π¯(p,ΛX(m)) since continuity of (p,m) 7→
π¯(p,Λ(m)) is obtained by an analogous argument. By definition of Vm, we want to
show that (p,m) 7→ M [Vm(p, ·)](m) is continuous. Let (pn, mn) → (p,m) and note
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that, for sufficiently large n,
|M [Vmn(pn, ·)](mn)−M [Vm(p, ·)](m)| ≤|M [Vmn(pn, ·)](mn)−M [Vm(pn, ·)](mn)|
+ |M [Vm(pn, ·)](mn)−M [Vm(p, ·)](m)|
≤ sup
p∈C
||M [Vmn(p, .)− Vm(p, ·)]||L∞
+ |M [Vm(pn, ·)](mn)−M [Vm(p, ·)](m)|
where C is some compact neighborhood of p. The second term in the RHS vanishes
because (p, t) 7→M [Vm(p, .)](t) is continuous (the proof follows from standard contrac-
tion mapping arguments and is omitted). Thus, the desired result follows by showing
that the first term in the RHS vanish. To do this, note that for any θ ∈ Θ and any
p ∈ C,
|M [Vmn(p, ·)− Vm(p, ·)](θ)| ≤̺|
ˆ
(1{θ ≤ mn} − 1{θ ≤ m})M [Vmn(p, .)](θ
′)f(θ′ | θ)dθ′|
+ ̺|
ˆ
(1{θ ≤ m})M [Vmn(p, .)− Vm(p, ·)](θ
′)f(θ′ | θ)dθ′|
≤̺|Bmn,m,p(θ)|+ ̺||M [Vmn(p, .)− Vm(p, ·)]||L∞.
where Bmn,m(θ) ≡
´
(1{θ ≤ mn} − 1{θ ≤ m})M [Vm′(p, .)](θ
′)f(θ′ | θ)dθ′. Therefore,
since ̺ < 1, it suffices to show that there exists a δ > 0 such that lim supn→∞ supp∈C ||Bmn,m,p||L∞ =
0. To do this, we first show that for each θ, lim supn→∞ supp∈C |Bmn,m,p(θ)| = 0.
It is easy to show that there exists aK <∞ such that supp∈C supm∈Θ ||Vm(p, ·)||L∞ ≤
K. So, for any θ′ ∈ Θ,
sup
p∈C
| (1{θ ≤ mn} − 1{θ ≤ m})M [Vmn(p, .)](θ
′)f(θ′ | θ)| ≤ K| (1{θ ≤ mn} − 1{θ ≤ m}) f(θ
′ | θ)|.
Thus, for any θ′ 6= m, lim supn→∞ supp∈C | (1{θ ≤ mn} − 1{θ ≤ m})M [Vmn(p, .)](θ
′)f(θ′ |
θ)| = 0. By the DCT, this readily implies that for any θ ∈ Θ, lim supn→∞ supp∈C |Bmn,m,p(θ)| =
0.
We now show that lim supn→∞ supp∈C supθ∈Θ |Bmn,m,p(θ)| = 0. Since Θ is compact
and we already established pointwise convergence, by the Arzela-Ascoli theorem it
suffices to show that the family {supp∈C |Bmn,m,p(·)|}n∈N is equi-continuous. To do
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this, note that for any θ and θ′,
sup
p∈C
|Bmn,m,p(θ
′)| − sup
p∈C
|Bmn,m,p(θ)| ≤ sup
p∈C
{
|Bmn,m,p(θ
′)| − |Bmn,m,p(θ)|
}
≤ sup
p∈C
|
ˆ
(1{θ ≤ mn} − 1{θ ≤ m})M [Vmn (p, .)](t)
(
f(t | θ)− f(t | θ′)
)
dt|
≤K × |
(
f(t | θ)− f(t | θ′)
)
dt|.
The RHS is continuous by Assumption 5(ii), and its “modulus of continuity” does not
depend on m′. Hence, {supp∈C |Bm′,m,p(·)|}n∈N is equi-continuous.
Proof of Lemma 5. Throughout the proof, we fix δ and omit it from the
notation. We now define certain mappings that will be used throughout the proof.
Let m 7→ pE(m) ≡ {p : π¯(p,Λ(m)) = κ}, and p 7→ mX(p) ≡ {m : π¯(p,ΛX(m)) = 0}
and m 7→ pX(m) = {p : mX(p) = m}. For the mapping mX , it is implicit that if
π¯(p,ΛX(m)) < 0 then mX(p) = θL and if π¯(p,ΛX(m)) > 0 then mX(p) = θH .
STEP 1. We now show that a solution to the system (ii’)-(iii’) exists and is
unique and, moreover, we show that for any (m, p) such that π¯(p,ΛX(m)) = 0 and
π¯(p,Λ(m)) = κ, then p < pE(m
′) for all m′ 6= m, i.e., m is a global minimizer of the
function pE .
Observe that by Assumption 5(i), ν ({C(0, θ) > 0}) > 0. Also, supp(Λ(m)) ⊇
supp(ν) for all m, so
´
C(0, θ)Λ(m)(dθ) > 0. This implies that if q¯(p,Λ(m)) = 0, then
π¯(p,Λ(m)) < 0 ≤ κ, so a (p,m) such that q¯(p,Λ(m)) = 0 can never be a solution to
π¯(p,Λ(m)) = κ (if it exists). Therefore, if the solution exists it would be such that
q¯(p,Λ(m)) > 0, in particular, this implies that p = 0 cannot be part of a solution.
Therefore, henceforth we focus on (p,m) such that Λ(m)({θ : q(p, w, θ) > 0}) > 0, in
particular, we only consider m ∈M ≡ {m ∈ Θ: ∃p : Λ(m)({θ : q(p, θ) > 0}) > 0}.
One of the following cases occurs: (a) pE − pX < 0; (b) pE − pX > 0 or (c) neither
(a) nor (b) occurs (i.e., pE − pX changes signs at least once in Θ). If (a) occurs, then
the solution to (ii’)-(iii’) exists and is given by m = θL and p such that π¯(p,Λ(m)) = κ
and π¯(m,ΛX(m)) < 0. Similarly, if (b) occurs, then the solution to (ii’)-(iii’) exists
and is given by m = θH and p such that π¯(p,Λ(m)) = κ and π¯(m,ΛX(m)) > 0.
Therefore, if either (a) or (b) occurs a solution exists and is unique.
We now show that the same holds if (c) occurs. Clearly, for existence of a solution
in this case it suffices that m 7→ pX(m) is continuous (i.e., for any (mn)n and (pn)n
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such that mn → m and pn ∈ pX(mn) with pn → p then p ∈ pX(m)) and closed-
and convex-valued; and that m 7→ pE(m) is single-valued and continuous. Continu-
ity of m 7→ pX(m) follows from Lemma 7; and by continuity and monotonicity of
p 7→ M [Vm(p, ·)](m), it follows that, for each m ∈ Θ, pX(m) is a closed interval.
Since p 7→ π(p, θ) is nondecreasing and increasing over p such that q(p, θ) > 0 and
supp(Λ(m)) ⊇ supp(ν) for all m, it follows that for any m ∈ M , p 7→ π¯(p,Λ(m)) is
increasing. Hence, pE(m) has at most one element. Moreover, since π¯(0,Λ(m)) ≤ 0
and lim infp→∞ π¯(p,Λ(m)) = ∞, continuity of p 7→ π¯(p,Λ(m)) ensures that pE(m) is
non-empty. Finally, continuity of m 7→ pE(m) follows from Lemma 7.
It thus remains to show that the solution in case (c) is unique. To do this, it
suffices to show that for any (m, p) such that π¯(p,ΛX(m)) = 0 and π¯(p,Λ(m)) = κ,
then p < pE(m
′) for all m′ 6= m, i.e., m is a global minimizer of the function pE . Since
p 7→ π¯(p,Λ(m)) is increasing, it suffices to show that for any m′ 6= m, π¯(p,Λ(m′)) <
π¯(p,Λ(m)) = κ.
For any m1 ≤ m2, let θ 7→ Am1,m2(θ) ≡ 1{m1 ≤ θ ≤ m2}M [Vm(p, .)](θ). Note
that M [Vm(p, .)](m) = π¯(p,ΛX(m)) = 0 and also θ 7→ M [Vm(p, .)](θ) is decreasing, so
M [Vm(p, .)](.) < (>)0 for all θ > (<)m. This, in turn, implies that Am1,m(.) > 0 and
Am,m2(.) < 0.
By definition of Vm, it follows that: If m
′ > m,
π¯(p,Λ(m′))−π¯(p,Λ(m)) =
ˆ
Am,m′(θ)ν(dθ)+̺
ˆ
1{θ ≤ m′}M [Vm′(p, .)−Vm(p, .)](θ)ν(dθ)
and if m′ < m,
π¯(p,Λ(m′))−π¯(p,Λ(m)) = −
ˆ
Am′,m(θ)ν(dθ)+̺
ˆ
1{θ ≤ m′}M [Vm′(p, .)−Vm(p, .)](θ)ν(dθ).
By our previous observations,
´
Am,m′(θ)ν(dθ) < 0 and −
´
Am′,m(θ)ν(dθ) < 0.
By Lemma 6 M [Vm′(p, .) − Vm(p, .)](θ) < 0 for any m
′ 6= m and any θ ∈ Θ. So,
π¯(p,Λ(m′))− π¯(p,Λ(m)) = π¯(p,Λ(m′))− κ < 0 as desired.
STEP 2. We now show that the solution (pe, me) for (ii’)-(iii’), which is unique
(see Step 1), satisfies
(pe, me) = argmin
p′,m′
A¯C(p′,Λ(m′, δ)).
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To show this, we first show that for any m, π¯(p,Λ(m)) = κ iff p = A¯C(p,Λ(m)) iff
p = minp′≥0AC(p
′,Λ(m)). The first ‘iff’ follows from simple algebra. To show the
second ‘iff’, let pm ≡ infp:q¯(p,Λ(m))=0 p <∞, and that implies that A¯C(pm,Λ(m)) =∞
for all p ≤ pm. Suppose for now (we show it below) that the following holds: (I) If
p < A¯C(p,Λ(m)), then A¯C(p′,Λ(m)) < A¯C(p,Λ(m)) for all p′ such that p < p′ <
A¯C(p,Λ(m)); (II) If p > A¯C(p,Λ(m)), then A¯C(p′,Λ(m)) > A¯C(p,Λ(m)) for all
p′ > p; and (III) There is at most one solution p to p = A¯C(p,Λ(m)).
We claim that by (I) and the facts that A¯C(pm,Λ(m)) = ∞ for all p ≤ pm and
continuity of A¯C(·,Λ(m)) over p > pm, there exists a solution p to p = A¯C(p,Λ(m))
and p > pm. To show this, suppose not, i.e., p < A¯C(p,Λ(m)) for all p. This implies
that there exists a p′ such that A¯C(p′,Λ(m)) < A¯C(p′′,Λ(m)) for all p′′ 6= p′, in
particular for any p′ < p′′ < A¯C(p′,Λ(m)). But this contradicts (I). By (I) and (II),
this solution minimizes A¯C(·,Λ(m)), and, by (III), this is the unique solution.
We now prove (I)-(III). Let p, p′ > pm and p
′ > p. By definition of optimal-
ity, pq(p, θ) − C(q(p, θ), θ) ≥ pq(p′, θ) − C(q(p′, θ), θ) and p′q(p′, θ) − C(q(p′, θ), θ) ≥
p′q(p, θ)−C(q(p, θ), θ). By simple algebra, integrating over Θ using Λ(m)(.), and the
fact that q¯(p′,Λ(m)) − q¯(p,Λ(m)) > 0 (by the assumption that p′ > p > pm and the
fact that p 7→ q(p, θ) is increasing for over p such that q(p, θ) > 0),
p ≤
C¯(p′,Λ(m))− C¯(p,Λ(m))
q¯(p′,Λ(m))− q¯(p,Λ(m))
≤ p′. (10)
First, suppose that p < A¯C(p,Λ(m)). Then (10) implies that, for all p′ such that
p < p′ < A¯C(p,Λ(m)),
A¯C(p′,Λ(m)) ≡
C¯(p′,Λ(m))
q¯(p′,Λ(m))
<
C¯(p,Λ(m))
q¯(p,Λ(m))
≡ A¯C(p,Λ(m)).
Thus, (I) is proven. Next, let p > A¯C(p,Λ(m)). Then (10) implies that A¯C(p′,Λ(m)) >
A¯C(p,Λ(m)) for all p′ > p; thus, (II) is proven. Finally, suppose p = A¯C(p,Λ(m))
and p′ = A¯C(p′,Λ(m)) with p′ > p. Putting together the two inequalities in (10),
p = A¯C(p,Λ(m)) = A¯C(p′,Λ(m)) = p′, which contradicts p′ > p. A similar contra-
diction obtains if we assume p′ < p. Therefore, p′ = p, and so (III) is proven.
Note that pE(m) = argminp′≥0 A¯C(p
′,Λ(m)). Moreover, if (me, pe) solves (ii’)-
(iii’), pe = pE(m
e). So in order to show the desired result it suffices to show that me =
argminm∈Θ A¯C(pE(m),Λ(m)), or equivalently, A¯C(pE(m
e),Λ(me)) < A¯C(pE(m),Λ(m))
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for all m 6= me. By step 1,
pe = pE(m
e) < pE(m
′)
for all m′ 6= m. Since, by our previous calculations in this step, A¯C(pE(m),Λ(m)) =
pE(m) for all m, the desired result follows. 
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